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CONFESSIONS

CONFESSIONS
The need for confessions
The need for confessions and the need to interrogate suspects in the absence of counsel and without
advising them of their right to remain silent have often
been asserted or assumed but also sharply disputed.
In Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), the defendant argued that every police denial of a suspect's
request to contact counsel should be viewed as a constitutional violation of the right to counsel, rendering
any resulting confession inadmissible. But a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court dismissed this contention
with the observation that it would have a "devastating
effect on enforcement of criminal law, for it would
effectively preclude police questioning-fair as well as
unfair-until the accused was afforded opportunity to
call his attorney" (Crooker, 441).
A few years later, in the course of a long plurality
opinion designed to develop a "set of principles" for
the "voluntariness" test, Justice Felix Frankfurter
thought it self-evident that, despite modern advances
in crime detection technology, police interrogation
of those suspected of involvement in an offense is
"often indispensable to crime detection" (Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 571 (1961)). It followed,
he thought, that "whatever reasonable means are
needed to make the questioning effective must also
be conceded to the police." Thus, "often prolongation of the interrogation period will be essential";
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"counsel for the suspect will generally prove a thorough obstruction to the investigation"; and even informing the suspect of his legal right to remain silent
"will prove an obstruction" (Culombe, 579-580).
The deep division in the Supreme Court in the mid1960s over the need to replace the traditional voluntariness test with new doctrines that imposed tighter
restrictions on police interrogation may be explained
to a considerable degree in terms of the Justices' differing views on the need for confessions. The majority
in the famous case of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964) observed that "history amply shows that confessions have often been extorted to save law enforcement officials the trouble and effort of obtaining valid
and independent evidence" (490). The opinion
strongly implied that a system which relies on "extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful
investigation" could, without seriously impairing police efficiency, replace a system "which comes to depend on the 'confession.' "
The four Justices who dissented in Escobedo also
dissented two years later in the landmark Miranda
opinion (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)),
and this time they made their disagreement even more
emphatic.Justice Byron White,joined by Justices John
Harlan and Potter Stewart, dissented, saying that the
Miranda decision "will measurably weaken the ability
of the criminal law to perform [its] tasks" and warning
that in a significant number of cases "the Court's rule
will return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the
streets [to] repeat his crime whenever it pleases him"
(526, 541-542). Justice Thomas Clark's dissenting
opinion expressed the fear that the Court's new "strict
constitutional specific inserted at the nerve center of
crime detection may well kill the patient" (500); and
the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan, joined by
Justices Stewart and White, stated that the "social
costs of crime are too great to call the new rules anything but a hazardous experimentation" (517).
The dire predictions of the Miranda dissenters find
little support in any of the empirical studies evaluating
the impact of that 1966 decision on the criminal justice
system. For example, one study concluded that the
need for confessions was important in only a small
number of cases and that warning a suspect of his
right to the assistance of counsel before answering
any questions and of his right to remain silent was
a factor in reducing the success of interrogation in
only about 10 percent of the cases evaluated (Project).
Studies such as this, however, cannot be viewed
as the last word on the need for confessions and the
importance of police interrogation. For one thing,
they suggest that suspects brought to the station
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house for questioning are in such a crisis-laden situation and are so often unable to grasp the full significance of what they are told that a system of police
warnings is simply an inadequate means of fortifying
a suspect's rights (Project, pp. 1572-1573, 1613).
Moreover, the above study points out that despite
the presence of student observers, suspects were
given the full Miranda warnings less than one-fourth
of the time and that when the police did give the
warnings, they often did so in a tone and manner
which gelded them of much of their meaning or incorporated some "hedging."
It may still be argued, therefore, that careful, unequivocal, and emphatic Miranda warnings or a more
effective means of implementing a suspect's rights
than police warnings (such as requiring the presence
of an attorney before a suspect can waive his rights)
would have had a devastating impact on law enforcement. This much, and perhaps only this much, can
be safely said: Whatever the actual facts, "the perceived
need [for confessions] surely has constituted the
strongest force against attempts to abolish or restrict
police interrogation" (Grano, 1979 b, p. 896; italics
added).

Historical background
The voluntariness test and its shortcomings. Until the 1940s, the rule that a confession was admissible
if not "coerced" or "involuntary" was essentially an
alternative statement of the rule that a confession was
admissible if free of influences that made it untrustworthy or "probably untrue" (Berger, pp. 102-103).
The "untrustworthiness" rationale-the view that the
rules governing the admissibility of confessions were
designed merely to protect the integrity of the factfinding process-was adequate to explain the exclusion of the confession in the first Fourteenth Amendment due process confession case, Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278 (1936), and in those cases that immediately followed, for they all involved threatened or
actual police brutality or violence. But when cases
involving the more subtle psychological pressures
began to appear, it became more difficult to assume
that the confessions excluded were unreliable as evidence of guilt.
The famous case of Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.
143 (1944) is instructive in this regard. A 6-3 majority
reversed a murder conviction based on a confession
obtained after thirty-six hours of almost continuous
police interrogation. However, there was ample reason to think that Ashcraft had indeed been involved
in the murder. The man he named as his wife's killer

promptly admitted the killing and accused Ashcraft
of hiring him to do the job. After the interrogation,
when examined by his family physician, Ashcraft made
an "entirely voluntary" statement explaining why he
wanted to kill his wife. Thus, "it is fair to suggest
that the result reached by the [Ashcraft] Court reflected
less a concern with the reliability of the confession
as evidence of guilt in the particular case than disapproval of police methods which a majority of the Court
conceived as generally dangerous and subject to serious abuse" (Allen, 1959, p. 235).
In Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) and two
companion cases, the Court overturned three convictions resting on coerced confessions without disputing the accuracy of Justice Robert Jackson's observation (concurring in Watts and dissenting in the other
two cases) that the confessions in each were "inherently believable" and "not shaken as to truth by anything that occurred at the trial.'' The Court responded
by pointing out that "the Due Process Clause bars
police procedure which violates the basic notions of our
accusatorial mode of prosecuting crime and vitiates
a conviction based on the fruits of such procedure"
(italics added).
That the Court was applying two constitutional
standards for the admissibility of confessions-a "police methods" test as well as a "trustworthiness" testwas made even clearer by subsequent cases. Thus,
in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), the Court
pointed out that the refusal to permit the use of involuntary confessions turned not only on their untrustworthiness but on "the deep-rooted feeling that the
police must obey the law while enforcing the law"
and on the premise that "life and liberty can be as
much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminal as from the actual
criminals themselves." The rejection of the untrustworthiness test as the exclusive rationale governing
the admissibility of confessions was underscored in
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). The trial
judge had found that the police pretense of bringing
the defendant's wife in for questioning had no tendency to produce a false confession, and in his charge
to the jury he had indicated that the admissibility of
the confession should tum on its probable reliability.
In reversing, the Court emphasized that the question
whether the police tactics had produced an involuntary confession had to be answered "with complete
disregard of whether or not [the defendant] in fact
spoke the truth."
The voluntariness test left much to be desired. It
soon became clear that the courts were not using such
terms as voluntariness and coercion as tools of analysis
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but as "shorthands" or conclusions. When a court
concluded that the police had resorted to intolerable
or sufficiently offensive interrogation tactics (the conclusion often turned on the "totality of circumstances," for example, the particular suspect's age,
background, or other characteristics), it characterized
the resulting confession as "involuntary" and talked
of "overbearing" or "breaking the will." When, on
the other hand, a court concluded that the interrogation techniques were acceptable under the circumstances, it called the resulting confession "voluntary"
and talked of "mental freedom" or "self-determination." Unfortunately, the courts shed insufficient light
on the underlying analyses that led them to label a
challenged confession "voluntary" or "involuntary"
(Bator and Vorenberg, pp. 72-73; Kamisar, pp. 14,
2 5, 70-76).
Moreover, as the rationales for the Supreme Court's
confession cases evolved, it became increasingly clear
that terms such as voluntariness, coercion, and breaking
the will were actually misleading. Such terms did not
focus directly on either of the two critical concernsthe offensiveness of the interrogation methods and
the tendency of these methods to produce a false confession (Kamisar, pp. 15-20; Paulsen, pp. 429-430;
Schulhofer, pp. 867-878).
Another problem with the voluntariness standard
was that because of its vagueness and the need to
assess the "totality of circumstances" (including such
factors as the age, intelligence, education, racial or
ethnic background, and previous criminal experience
of the suspect), it furnished very little guidance to
police officers seeking to ascertain what interrogation
tactics they could use or to trial judges seeking to
ascertain what criteria they should apply in resolving
confession claims (Berger, pp. 107-112; Schulhofer,
pp. 86g-870).
As police interrogators made greater use of psychological techniques over the years, the always difficult
problems of proof facing the person so questioned
became aggravated. Frequently, the defendant was
inarticulate and his perceptions were not acute. The
disputed events inevitably occurred in secret, with the
suspect isolated and often frightened or confused.
Moreover, the local courts almost always resolved the
virtually inevitable "swearing contest" over what happened behind closed doors in favor of the police. Perhaps this was because any trial judge is so close to
the scene that it is especially hard for him "to set
apart the question of the guilt or innocence of a particular defendant and focus solely upon the procedural
aspect of the case" (Schaefer, 1956, p. 7).
As Geoffrey Stone has observed, "Given the [Su-
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preme] Court's inability to articulate a clear and predictable definition of voluntariness, the apparent persistence of state courts in utilizing the ambiguity of the
concept to validate confessions of doubtful constitutionality, and the resultant burden on its own workload, it seemed inevitable that the [Supreme] Court
would seek 'some automatic device by which the potential evils of incommunicado interrogation [could]
be controlled'" (pp. 102-103). The Supreme Court's
dissatisfaction with the elusive voluntariness test and
its efforts to replace the test with a more concrete
and workable standard were to culminate in the Miranda decision.
The right-to-counsel approach. The case of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) arose as follows: After Massiah had been indicted for various federal narcotic violations, had retained a lawyer and
pleaded not guilty, and had been released on bail,
Massiah was invited by his codefendant, Colson, to
discuss the pending case in Colson's car. Massiah assumed he was simply talking to a friend, his partner
in crime, who had also been indicted, but unknown
to him Colson had become a secret government agent.
A radio transmitter had been installed under the front
seat ofColson's car to enable a nearby agent equipped
with a receiving device to overhear the Massiah-Colson conversation. As expected, Massiah made several
damaging admissions.
Despite the fact that Massiah was neither in custody
nor subjected to police interrogation as these terms are
usually understood, a 6-3 majority of the Supreme
Court held that his damaging admissions should have
been excluded from evidence. The decisive feature
of the case was that after he had been indicted-"and
therefore at a time when he was clearly entitled to a
lawyer's help"-govemment agents had "deliberately
elicited" statements from him in the absence of counsel. Massiah stands for the proposition that once a
person is formally charged or 'judicial" or "adversary" criminal proceedings have otherwise been initiated against him, his right to the assistance of counsel
has "begun" or "attached." Unless the defendant voluntarily and knowingly waives that right, the absence
of counsel under such circumstances is alone sufficient
to exclude any resulting incriminating statements.
Massiah was soon overshadowed by Escobedo, decided a short five weeks later in the same term. When
Escobedo was taken into custody, the police told him
that he had been named as the one who killed his
brother-in-law. Escobedo repeatedly but unsuccessfully asked to speak to his lawyer. Instead, the police
arranged a confrontation between him and his accuser, DiGerlando. In the course of denying that he

226

CONFESSIONS

had fired the fatal shots and claiming that DiGerlando
had done so, Escobedo implicated himself in the murder.
Although Escobedo's interrogation had occurred
before judicial or adversary proceedings had commenced against him, a 5-4 majority of the Court held
that Escobedo's incriminating statements should have
been excluded:
The interrogation here was conducted before petitioner was
formally indicted. But in the context of this case, that fact
should make no difference. When petitioner requested, and
was denied, an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, the
investigation had ceased to be a general investigation of
'an unsolved crime.' [Citation omitted] Petitioner had become the accused and the purpose of the investigation was
to 'get him' to confess his guilt despite his constitutional
right not to do so. At the time of his arrest, and throughout
the course of the interrogation, the police told petitioner
that they had convincing evidence that he had fired the
fatal shots .... Petitioner, a layman, was undoubtedly unaware that ... an admission of 'mere' complicity in the
murder plot was legally as damaging as an admission of
firing of the fatal shots. [Citation omitted] The 'guiding
hand of counsel' was essential to advise [him] of his rights
in this delicate situation. . . . It would exalt form over substance to make the right to counsel, under these circumstances, depend on whether at the time of the interrogation,
the authorities had secured a formal indictment [485-486].
Until Miranda moved the decision off center stage
two years later, the scope and meaning of Escobedo
was a matter of strong and widespread disagreement.
In large part this was the result of the accordionlike
quality of the Court's opinion. Parts of the opinion
suggest that a suspect's right to counsel comes into
play whenever the investigation begins to focus on
him, regardless of whether he is in custody or has
asked for a lawyer. At some places the opinion
launches so broad an attack on the use of confessions
in general and so emphatically rejects the need for
an "effective interrogation opportunity" that it threatens (or promises) to eliminate virtually all police interrogation. At other places, however, the opinion is
quite confining, so much so that it arguably limits
the case to its special facts (Escobedo had specifically
and repeatedly requested, and had repeatedly been
denied, an opportunity to seek advice from counsel;
the police had failed to warn him of his right to remain
silent; and he was in police custody).

The Miranda case
The Court in Massiah and Escobedo seemed to be
moving in the direction of banning all incriminating

statements obtained from a suspect, even "volunteered" statements, unless they were made knowingly
and with the tactical assistance of counsel. Strongly
protesting this development, the Escobedo dissenters
maintained that it was "incongruous to assume that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel rather than
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination governed the admissibility of confessions" (497).
The self-incrimination provision ("No person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself"), they stressed, "addresses itself to
the very issue of incriminating admissions and resolves it by proscribing only compelled statements"
(497; italics added).
A remarkable feature of the American confessions
law is that the self-incrimination provision was long
deemed inapplicable to police interrogation. It was
not until 1964 that the Supreme Court even held that
Fourteenth Amendment due process "secures against
state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement-the
right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses
to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will,
and to suffer no penalty [for] such silence" (Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964); italics added). But
until Miranda the privilege against self-incrimination
had not been deemed applicable in federal confession
cases either--certainly not as it applied to judicial or
other formal proceedings.
Why had the self-incrimination provision been excluded from the police station and other kinds of"custodial interrogation" until Miranda? The legal reasoning was that "compulsion" to testify against oneself
meant l,egal compulsion. Thus, a legislative committee
could not hold a witness in contempt for refusing
to incriminate himself. Nor could a court hold a defendant in contempt for refusing to testify at his own
trial. But a person subjected to police interrogation
cannot l,egally be compelled to say anything, since he
is threatened neither with perjury for testifying falsely
nor with contempt for refusing to testify at all. Thus
it could not be said, ran the pre-Miranda argument,
that the interrogated suspect was being "compelled"
to be a witness against himself within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment-even though he was likely
to assume or be led by the police to believe that there
were legal (or extralegal) sanctions for refusing to
"cooperate" (Kamisar, pp. 45-46; Schaefer, 1967, pp.
16-18; Traynor, p. 674).
In Miranda a 5-4 majority, speaking through Chief
Justice Earl Warren, concluded at long last that "all
the principles embodied in the privilege [against selfincrimination] apply to informal compulsion exerted
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by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning" (461). Observed the Court:
An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police
custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected
to the [tactics described in various police interrogation manuals, from which the Court quoted at length] cannot be
otherwise than under compulsion to speak. As a practical
matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of
the police station may well be greater than in courts or
other official investigations, where there are often impartial
observers to guard against intimidation or trickery [461].
[The "interrogation environment"] carries its own badge
of intimidation [and] is at odds with [the privilege against
self-incrimination]. Unless adequate protective devices are
employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial
surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant
can truly be the product of his free choice [457-458].

The "adequate protective" devices necessary to
"neutralize" the "interrogation environment"-the
coercive conditions surrounding or inherent in "custodial police interrogation"-are, of course, the now
familiar "Miranda warnings." Miranda's confession
would have plainly been admissible a few years earlier,
for he had confessed to a rape-kidnapping after only
two hours of questioning. But what proved fatal for
the government was that neither before nor during
the questioning had the police advised him of his right
to remain silent, his right to consult with an attorney
(either retained or, if the defendant is indigent, as
Miranda was, appointed) before answering questions,
or his right to have an attorney present during the
interrogation.
Although Miranda is grounded primarily on the
privilege against self-incrimination, it also has a rightto-counsel component designed to protect and to reinforce the privilege. After he has been taken into custody "or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way" and prior to any questioning,
a suspect must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent and to be advised that "anything said can and
will be used against [him] in court" (469). But such
a warning (and explanation) "cannot itself suffice"
to "assure that the individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process" (469). Thus, the suspect must also be told of his right to counsel, either
retained or appointed. "The need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not
merely a right to consult with counsel prior to any
questioning, but also to have counsel present during
any questioning if the defendant so desires" (470).
A suspect, of course, may waive his rights, provided
he does so "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently"
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(444). But no valid waiver can be recognized "unless
specifically made after the warnings [have] been
given" (470). Moreover, the "mere fact that [a person]
may have answered some questions or volunteered
some statements on his own does not deprive him
of the right to refrain from answering any further
inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and
thereafter consents to be questioned" (445).
Miranda was the "high-water mark" of the Warren
Court's "due process revolution" (Graham, 1970, p.
157). It plunged "the Warren Court into an ocean
of abuse" and became "one of the leading issues of
the 1968 presidential campaign" (Lieberman, p. 326).
Nevertheless, the case may fairly be viewed as a compromise between the old voluntariness test (and the
coercive interrogation tactics which that elusive test
permitted in fact) and extreme proposals (based on
an expansive reading of Massiah and Escobedo) that,
as was feared (or hoped) on the eve of Miranda, would
have "killed" confessions.
Miranda did not, and was not designed to, "kill"
confessions. It allows the police to conduct "general
on-the-scene questioning" or "other general questioning of citizens" (4 77-4 78) even though the citizen
is neither informed nor aware of his rights. Moreover,
according to Miranda, so long as the police do not
question the suspect, they are free to hear and act
upon volunteered statements even though the suspect
has been brought to the police station or otherwise
taken into custody. Custody does not in itself call for
the Miranda warnings. It is only the combination of custody and interrogation that establishes the interrogation environment which is so at odds with the privilege
against self-incrimination and which calls for Miranda's protective devices (Kamisar, pp. 195-197).
On the eve of Miranda, fear was voiced that the
Supreme Court might "project" counsel into the police station, and doubts were raised whether it would
still be "possible to enforce criminal law" if that were
to occur (Kamisar et al., p. 523; cf. pp. 498-514).
But Miranda did not fully project counsel into the station house, for it did not require that a suspect actually
consult with a lawyer in order for his waiver of constitutional rights to be valid.
Whether suspects are continuing to confess because
they do not fully grasp the meaning of the Miranda
warnings, because the promptings of conscience override the impact of the warnings, or because the police
are hedging or undermining the warnings, it is plain
that they are continuing to confess with great frequency (Stephens, pp. 165-200; Project; Medalie,
Zeitz, and Alexander). It is difficult to believe that
this would have been the case if Miranda had fully

228

CONFESSIONS

projected counsel into the interrogation room by requiring the advice of counsel or the presence of counsel before a suspect could effectively waive counsel
and his right to remain silent.
Because Miranda was the centerpiece of the Warren
Court's "revolution in American criminal procedure"
and the prime target "of those who attributed the
mounting wave of crime to the softness of judges"
(Lieberman, p. 326), almost everyone expected the
Burger Court to treat Miranda unkindly. And it did,
for a decade. Thus, the new Court held that statements obtained by police who issued defective warnings or who refused to honor a suspect's assertion
of his rights and continued to question him, although
inadmissible in the presentation of the prosecution's
own case, could be used to impeach the defendant's
credibility if he took the stand (Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222 (1971); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714
(1975); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), in
which a second interrogation session that occurred
after a suspect initially refused to make a statement
did not violate Miranda under the circumstances of
the case; Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977),
in which it was held that not all police questioning
that takes place in a station house is necessarily "custodial interrogation").
However, in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291
(1980), the Court gave interrogation within the meaning
of Miranda a fairly generous interpretation, holding
that the Miranda safeguards come into force "whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express
questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to
say, the term 'interrogation' refers not only to express
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the
part of the police (other than those normally attendant
to arrest and custody) that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect" (300-301).
One may quarrel with the Court's application of its
definition of interrogation to the Innis facts, as the three
dissenters did. The majority held that Innis had not
been interrogated when, after he had been arrested
and put in a squad car, two police officers conversing
with each other in the front of the car, but in Innis's
presence, expressed concern that because the murder
had occurred in the vicinity of a school for handicapped children, one of the children might find the
missing shotgun and injure himself. At this point, Innis interrupted the officers and offered to lead them
to where the shotgun was hidden. But Innis is a harder
case than most because there was "a basis for concluding that the officer's remarks were made for some

purpose other than that of obtaining evidence from
the suspect. An objective listener could plausibly conclude that the policemen's remarks in Innis were made
solely to express their genuine concern about the danger posed by the hidden shotgun." The suspect might
have viewed the purpose of the police conversation
in the front of the car the same way, and if he did,
"he would differentiate the speech or conduct from
a 'direct question' because he would not see it as a
demand for information" (White, 1980, pp. 12341235).
Considering the various alternatives, the Innis case's
definition of interrogation seems more significant than
the Court's questionable application ofit in that case.
The Court might have adopted a mechanical approach, as some lower courts had, and limited interrogation to those situations in which the police directly
address a suspect. It might have limited interrogation
to those instances in which the record establishes that
the police intended to elicit an incriminating response, a rule that would have been very difficult to
administer. But the Court did not adopt either of these
approaches. Moreover, by explicitly including police
tactics that do not involve verbal conduct, the Court
appears to have repudiated the position taken by a
number of lower courts that confronting a suspect
with incriminating physical evidence or with an accomplice who has confessed and is seeking to put
most of the blame on his cosuspect is not interrogation because it involves no verbal conduct on the part
of the police (White, 1980, p. 1234).
Despite the fairly generous reading of Miranda in
the Innis case, by holding the defendant's incriminating disclosures admissible the Court maintained its
record of not excluding a single item of evidence
solely on Miranda grounds since Warren Burger became Chief Justice in June of 1969. But that elevenyear record was broken the following year. Without
a dissent, the Court excluded incriminating statements on the authority of Miranda in two 1981 cases
decided the same day: Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477 (1981) and Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981)
(alternative holding).
In Edwards, the suspect asserted his right to counsel,
but the police, without furnishing him a lawyer, returned the next day and reinterrogated him. The
Court held that once a suspect requests a lawyer, he
cannot be subjected to further interrogation until
counsel has been made available to him "unless the
[suspect] himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conversation with the police" (Edwards,
485). In Smith, the Court held that the death sentence
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imposed on the defendant was fatally tainted by the
use, during the penalty phase of his trial, of a courtappointed psychiatrist's pretrial evaluation of the defendant's future dangerousness. The admission of the
psychiatrist's testimony, ruled the Court, violated the
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, because he was not advised before the psychiatric examination that he had a right to remain silent and that
any statement he made could be used against him
at a capital sentencing proceeding.

The demise of Escobedo and the revivification
of Massiah
Although the Miranda Court understandably tried
to retain some continuity with the Escobedo opinion,
it has become increasingly clear that Miranda actually
marked a fresh start in describing the circumstances
under which Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections
come into play. Escobedo seemed to assign great significance to the amount of evidence available to the police
at the time of questioning; the opinion therefore contains much talk about "prime suspects," "focal point,"
and the "accusatory stage." But Miranda attaches primary significance to the conditions surrounding, or inherent
in, the interrogation setting; thus, the opinion includes much discussion of the "interrogation environment" and the "police-dominated" atmosphere. If an
individual is subjected to custodial interrogation, Miranda applies whether or not the individual is a prime
suspect or the focal point of the investigation. On
the other hand, if a person is not subjected to custodial interrogation and the pressures generated
thereby, despite the implications of Escobedo he is not
entitled to be advised of his rights no matter how
intensely the police have focused on him or to what
extent they regard him as the prime suspect. In short,
Miranda did not enlarge Escobedo as much as it displaced it (Kamisar, pp. 162-163).
The same cannot be said for Massiah. Although Miranda has dominated the confessions scene since the
mid- l 960s, Massiah has emerged as the other major
Warren Court confessions doctrine. As clarified and
strengthened by two Burger Court decisions, Brewer
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and United States v.
Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), Massiah holds that once
adversary or judicial proceedings have commenced
against an individual (by way of indictment, information, or "initial appearance" before a magistrate), government efforts to "deliberately elicit" incriminating
statements from him, whether done openly by uniformed police officers (as in Williams) or surrepti-
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tiously by "secret agents" (as in Massiah and Henry),
violate the individual's right to counsel. The Massiah
doctrine represents a "pure" or "straight" right-tocounsel approach. It comes into play regardless of
whether a person is in custody or being subjected
to interrogation in the Miranda sense. There need
not be any "compelling influences," inherent, informal, or otherwise. In the Massiah case itself, of course,
the defendant was free on bail and unaware that he
was talking to a government agent. He thought he
was merely chatting with a codefendant.
Massiah operates on the premise that "by its history,
language, and function, the [Sixth Amendment]
sought to draw a starting point after which counsel's
assistance is generally required as an element of
our adversary system" (Israel, p. 1368, n. 224). This
starting point is reached when judicial or adversary
criminal proceedings are initiated. At this point the
criminal investigation has ended and the criminal
prosecution, to which the pure right to counsel is
applicable, has begun. The adverse positions of the
government and the defendant have solidified. The
parties, as the Court put it in the Henry case, are then
" 'arms length' adversaries" (273). At this point, it
seems, the government has built its case. But if it
has not, it may no longer elicit any information from
the defendant himself. It may only proceed against
him through his counsel.
The Burger Court decisions in Williams and Henry
revitalized Massiah; one might even say they "disinterred" it {Grano, 1979a, p. 7). For until these decisions, there was good reason to think that Massiah
had only been a stepping-stone to Escobedo and that
it had been lost in the shuffle of fast-moving events
that reshaped constitutional criminal procedure in the
1960s (Kamisar, pp. xvi, 160-164).
Actually, the Henry case not only reaffirmed the Massiah doctrine but expanded it, for it applied Massiah
to a situation in which the Federal Bureau oflilvestigation had instructed its secret agent, ostensibly a fellow
prisoner, not to question the defendant about the
crime, and there was no showing that he had. But it
sufficed that the FBI had "intentionally create[ d] a
situation likely to induce [the defendant] to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel" (Henry, 274). The government created such a situation, ruled the Henry Court, when an FBI agent
instructed the undercover informant to be alert to
any statements made by the defendant, who was
housed in the same cellblock. "Even if the FBI agent's
statement is accepted that he did not intend that [the
defendant's] 'fellow inmate' would take affirmative
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steps to secure incriminating information, [he] must
have known that such propinquity likely would lead
to that result" (271).

Some final thoughts
Although few, if any, would have predicted it in
the mid- l 970s, in the second decade of the Burger
Court, Miranda was not only very much alive but in
some respects reinvigorated. Moreover, the Massiah
doctrine had emerged as a much more potent force
than it ever had been in the Warren Court era. Although at various times in the 1970s several members
of the Burger Court seemed to be casting a longing
eye at the old "voluntariness" test, the Court's action
in Edwards and Smith, its generous reading of Miranda
in the Innis case, and its even more generous reading
of Massiah in the Henry case have, to borrow the language of one commentator, "reaffirmed its commitment to controlling police efforts to induce confessions by constitutional rules that look beyond the
voluntariness test" (White, 1979 b, p. 69).
Whatever chipping away or retreats from Miranda
and Massiah are achieved by the Supreme Court, "one
can be sure that the status quo ante will not be restored. By reason of what the Warren Court said and
did, we now perceive as problems what too often were
not seen as problems before. This is the dynamic of
change, and that fact may well be more significant
than many of the solutions proposed by the Warren
Court" (Allen, 1975, p. 539).
YALE KAMISAR

See also COUNSEL: RIGHT TO COUNSEL; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS; EXCLUSIONARY RULES.
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